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Key Points: Experiment shows effectiveness of Ambient-based policy  
         Different levels of water quality information lead to different behavior 
         Enhanced water quality information improves social efficiency 
Abstract: Stemming from Segerson [1988], literature on nonpoint source pollution 
shows that ambient-based regulatory policies can induce polluters in a common 
watershed to comply with an exogenously determined emissions standard. This study 
uses laboratory economic experiments in a spatially heterogeneous setting to test the 
effectiveness of an ambient tax/subsidy policy in a setting with realistic in-stream nutrient 
transport dynamics when varying levels of ambient information about the pollution is 
available to the agents and the regulator. We find that increasing the frequency of 
ambient monitoring improves the spatial allocation of emissions reductions. In particular 
with more frequent monitoring, the ambient-based policy induces firms further from the 
monitoring point to reduce emissions significantly more than downstream firms. Overall, 
the results suggest that enhanced information, especially enhanced temporal resolution, 
leads to efficiency gains.  
Index terms: 6309 1880 1846 0478 
Key words: Nonpoint source pollution, Ambient-based policy, Information, Laboratory 
economic experiment, River and Stream Water Quality Model  
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Inefficiency in the nonpoint source pollution setting stems from information asymmetries 
between the environmental regulator and the agents whose activities generate pollution 
emissions [Xepapadeas, 2011]. The ambient-based policy instrument proposed by 
Segerson [1988] circumvents information challenges by providing incentives for agents to 
reduce pollution emission so as to achieve an exogenously determined target for “bottom 
of the river” ambient measurement of pollution concentration. Theory and experimental 
evidence shows this mechanism to be effective at achieving concentrations of pollution 
close to the target.  
In practice, even when targeting ambient pollution, information problems exist.  
Currently deployed water sensing technology measures pollution concentration 
imperfectly. Typical nonpoint source pollutants like nitrogen, phosphorus, and bacteria 
pass through a point in the river in a flux following runoff events. These periods of elevated 
concentration can pass in a matter of hours or up to days.  The “shape” of these fluxes over 
time at the sensor will be affected heterogeneously by land parcels of varying distance from 
the sensor. Current methods of water quality monitoring that can be done by city and county 
environmental offices, state pollution control agencies, and/or national agencies such as 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rely on either manual sampling, which 
can occur on a timeframe of weeks to months, or mechanical auto-samplers which collect 
and store samples on a daily or multiday basis at pre-specified monitoring points, which 
can be manually retrieved and analyzed at regular intervals [Pellerin et al., 2013]. This 
disconnect between the continuous change in contaminant concentrations and the discrete 
observations of water quality creates an additional level of asymmetric information. From 
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the context of a contaminant flux, observation times are random. Therefore, the response 
of policy to levels of pollution emissions is stochastic. Additionally, in a well-developed 
model of nutrient transport, the contribution of contaminants from individual parcels 
accumulates, transforms, and dissipates as it flows downstream. This spatial process 
induces a systematic heterogeneity between polluters.   
Recent technological advances in water quality monitoring are allowing more 
frequent or even continuous monitoring and measurement using in-stream sensors [Pellerin 
et al. 2013]. Though still costly, these sensors can offer high frequency measurements of 
the nutrient flux at fixed points in a stream. This increase in temporal resolution of 
monitoring could reduce or eliminate the uncertainty in the policy response to nonpoint 
source pollution. Deploying an array of such sensors will increase the spatial resolution of 
water quality monitoring and reduce the level of heterogeneity between agents, as well as 
the informational asymmetry between nonpoint source polluters and the regulator.  
This study examines the impact of increased water quality monitoring resolution 
on individual polluters’ behavior by using laboratory economic experiments to test the 
effectiveness of ambient tax/subsidy policies under different monitoring regimes. Previous 
economic experiments studies have assumed that all polluters have an equal impact on 
pollution at the monitoring point. We build upon this work, but embed our experiments 
into a realistic stream-flow model that governs the marginal damage of emissions at 
specific points along a waterway. Importantly, we show that given this spatial 
heterogeneity, the frequency of monitoring can improve the efficiency of emissions 
reductions by altering their allocation across polluters. 
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Theoretical research on nonpoint source pollution has demonstrated that ambient-
based policy instruments can be designed so as to induce polluters to comply with an 
emission standard [e.g., Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 1992; Cabe & Herriges, 1992; 
Xepapadeas, 1995; Horan et al., 1998]. Economic experiments have been frequently used 
in situations where real choice behavior is normally unobservable to examine the extent to 
which theoretic predictions align with actual behavior [Messer et al., 2014]. In these 
experiments, it has been found that some ambient-based policy instruments can induce 
nearly efficient outcomes [e.g., Spraggon, 2002, 2004, 2013; Alpízar et al., 2004; Poe et 
al., 2004; Cochard et al., 2005; Vossler et al., 2006; Suter, Vossler and Poe, 2009; Vossler, 
Suter and Poe, 2013]. Nearly efficient outcomes have been found both with communication 
[Suter et al., 2008] and with subject pools composed of professionals [Suter and Vossler, 
2014]. 
Most previous studies on ambient-based policies assume that the ambient pollution 
concentration is a constant, symmetric function of polluters’ production decisions, and that 
regulator has perfect real-time information about this constant ambient pollution. Several 
studies add a symmetric error term to the measured concentration to mimic uncertainty 
caused by stochastic environmental factors such as weather [e.g., Spraggon, 2002; Vossler 
et al., 2006]. These approaches, however, do not capture the systematic, non-linear 
relationship between individual sources of emissions and the observed ambient pollution 
level at a given point in time. Spatial differences amongst polluters and the fate and 
transport of pollutants in a river system imply that the concentration of nonpoint source 
pollution at a point is unlikely to be linearly related to every polluter’s emission level 
[Charpa et al., 2008]. 
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A growing body of research in experimental economics shows that spatial 
heterogeneity may affect agents’ behavior, especially in the context of common pool 
resources [e.g., Schnier, 2009; Suter et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014]. Adding 
spatial information brings one type of agent heterogeneity into experiments testing ambient 
instruments. Some previous nonpoint source pollution studies have introduced 
heterogeneous polluters by varying the parameters that affect their private benefit function 
[Spraggon, 2004, 2013; Suter and Vossler, 2013]; however, incorporating spatial 
heterogeneity and differing information sets remains an important gap in the literature that 
we address in our experiments.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to use an experimental design 
that includes a realistic physical nutrient transport model, which induces an implicit spatial 
heterogeneity. The in-stream water quality model (see Supporting Information Text S1) is 
based on a model distributed by the EPA as part of a set of tools for developing Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) standards [Chapra et al., 2008]. The model captures several 
in-stream processes including the water flow effects of a discrete runoff event; the physical 
behavior of nutrients within the channel associated with downstream flow and diffusion; 
and biochemical interactions between different forms of nitrogen, phosphorus, and algae. 
From an economic perspective, this model is interesting because it introduces systematic, 
nonlinear heterogeneity in the effect of individual decisions on environmental damages. 
When an ambient tax/subsidy mechanism is integrated into this setting the heterogeneity 
passes through to each participant’s individual payoff function.  
The experimental design involves six firms producing the same good in different 
locations along a river, with differences in spatial location influencing the marginal damage 
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associated with production. The experiments implement an ambient tax/subsidy policy 
designed to reduce emissions under six different information treatments. While participants 
did not know the specific mathematical details of the nutrient transport model, they were 
trained on it using a calculator that displayed concentration and transfers for any set of 
production decisions across participants. The experiment instructions also provided the 
participants with a general description of the dynamics of the model. The objective of the 
treatments is to measure the extent to which information on ambient water quality, 
represented by the number of sensors (spatial resolution) and the frequency of monitoring 
using sensors (temporal resolution), influences firm-level decisions and social efficiency 
outcomes.  
Based on the results of the experiments we find that polluters respond to changes 
in resolution of water quality information differently based on their spatial location. 
Upstream polluters abate more than downstream polluters in enhanced temporal 
information treatments. The information treatments generate differences in social 
efficiency where enhanced temporal information improves the allocation of emissions 
reductions across parcels.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
In this experiment, participants take the role of firms in a common watershed making 
production decisions on parcels adjacent to a river. They face an exogenous price for the 
produced good such that their production decision entirely determines their private income. 
Firms’ production creates a byproduct (hereafter referred to as emissions; an example of 
this byproduct would be the use of fertilizer in agricultural production.) proportional to 
production, which enters the river and causes damage to unspecified downstream users. 
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The ambient level of pollution at any point in the stream over time depends on the upstream 
firms’ production decisions and the in-channel nutrient dynamics. A regulator has the 
ability to measure the concentration of pollution in different monitoring regimes, 
determined by the locations and the frequency at which measurements are taken. The firms 
face a tax or subsidy from a regulator based on the measured ambient pollution. Typical of 
the nonpoint source setting, the measured ambient level of pollution is public information, 
while firms’ emissions are private.  
The monitoring regimes are varied within participants in a two-by-three design over 
two levels of spatial resolution (one or two sensors) and three levels of monitoring 
frequency (low, high, and continuous, Table 1). A “no policy” control treatment is also 
implemented as a baseline. To best understand the setting, we first describe the stream and 
pollution dynamics followed by the details of the treatments.  
 
2.1 Nutrient Transport Model 
The nutrient transport dynamics are developed based on the QUAL2E/QUAL2K model 
[Chapra et al., 2008]. The physical parameters to calibrate this model are drawn from 
existing studies for the mid-Atlantic US, specifically from Skippack Creek in Pennsylvania 
[EPA, 2005] and the Pocomoke River in Delaware [DNREC, 2005], which are streams that 
have nonpoint source pollution problems. Previous studies have applied this water quality 
model in other regions of the US and internationally [e.g., NMED, 2006; USBR, 2008; 
Bischoff et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2012]. This model tracks the interactions of the 
following nutrients: organic nitrogen (N), ammonium (NH4), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), 
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nitrate (NO3), organic phosphorus (P), inorganic P, and algae. We focus on the dynamics 
of total N, which is the sum of nitrogen species mentioned above.  
In this model, a stream, which is adjacent to k homogenous parcels, is divided into 
k+1 sections called “reaches,” labeled Ri, i = 0, 1, 2, …, k. R0 is the “headwater”. Rk is the 
state of the river downstream from the last parcel. For the purposes of our experiment, we 
model six parcels, (k = 6). Water is assumed to flow from the headwater reach at a constant 
rate to the downstream reaches. Stream channel characteristics, including length, width, 
area and slope, are also assumed to be constant across reaches. We label the parcel adjacent 
to Ri as parcel i.  
Total N concentration at a given reach in the stream can be monitored using certain 
sensing technology over an interval of time, which we refer to as the “sensing window.” 
Following the Qual2K model, emissions move down the river in discrete time steps, t = 0, 
1, 2, … Within the sensing window, a sensor may make an observation at any of these time 
step.  We assume that once production decisions are made, the resulting emissions from 
each firm enter the river simultaneously at window = 1. Besides the loadings from firms 
on parcels 1 through 6, there are constant but relatively large background nutrient loads 
that enter each reach R0 to R6 at constant rates at each time step (see Supporting Information 
Table S1). The effect of an individual’s production decision on observed concentration at 
the sensor will then depend on their location, production decisions of the others and the 
timing of the sensing.  
Water in each reach begins with low concentration of total N (855 µgN/L) and 
upstream water of reach R0 always has a constant nutrient concentration (855 µgN/L). 
Without extra loadings from firms, the concentration of total N in each reach increases 
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gradually to a unique steady state of higher concentration in a later time period of the 
sensing window. However, when adding extra nutrient loading from each firm, 
concentration in each reach can have a peak at an earlier time of sensing window and then 
decrease to the steady state gradually or decrease to a level lower than the steady state and 
increase to the steady state later, depending on the location and level of the emissions.  
We make the assumption that the economic damage is determined by the maximum 
concentration during the sensing window downstream from the sixth parcel. The marginal 
damage of an increase in emissions at a given parcel is therefore determined by the effect 
that this increase has on the maximum concentration. (This assumption derives from 
occurrence of algal blooms. Research has demonstrated that algal blooms are highly 
correlated with the maximum pollution concentrations. For example, Lapointe [1997] finds 
that blooms happened in reefs of Jamaica and Southeast Florida mainly because nutrient 
concentration exceeded a threshold level. Studies have also found that pollution damages 
are highest at the mouth of rivers. Tang et al. [2006] analyze spatial characteristics of 
harmful algal blooms in the east coast of China from 1933 to 2004 and find that the most 
frequent harmful algal blooms occurrence areas are at the mouth of the Yangtze River and 
areas located south of the Yangtze River estuary in the East China Sea.) 
There are two components that influence how the decision made by a particular 
parcel influences the maximum concentration. The first component is the duration of the 
impact and the second is the magnitude of the impact. The production decision made at a 
given parcel is more likely to influence the maximum in situations where emissions from 
that parcel have a longer duration of impact in the sensing window. Increases in emissions 
from upstream parcels have a larger duration of impact than downstream parcels, since 
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their emissions tend to diffuse over a larger area of the stream over time. Emissions from 
parcels close to the sensor pass by the sensor more quickly and therefore have a more 
limited duration of impact. The production decision made at a given parcel is also more 
likely to influence the maximum concentration the higher the magnitude of its impact. 
Parcels closer to the sensor may have a higher magnitude of impact than parcels further 
upstream, since the emissions do not have the opportunity to diffuse over time before 
reaching the sensor. 
The dynamics through which these two competing impacts influence the 
maximum concentration are complex, but generally follow the following characterization. 
When emissions at a parcel are sufficiently low, increases in emissions have little effect on 
the maximum concentration. However, above a parcel-specific threshold level, additional 
emissions can have a larger effect on the maximum concentration. This parcel-specific 
threshold depends on the emissions decisions of other parcels, but, in general, is higher for 
parcels closer to the sensor (downstream parcels), than parcels further away (upstream 
parcels). This means that relatively low emissions levels can impact the maximum 
concentration for firms further away from the sensor while only relatively high emissions 
levels impact the maximum for the downstream firms. Two features of the calibrated 
QUAL2K model cause this outcome. Firstly, emissions from upstream firms mix with a 
large amount of accumulated background nutrient loading later in the sensing window. As 
a consequence, even relatively low emissions from upstream firms can induce a maximum 
concentration higher than the steady state. Secondly, emissions from the downstream firms 
pass through the sensor early in the sensing window when the background nutrient level 
has not accumulated. Therefore, when emissions from upstream firms are relatively low, 
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relative high emissions of downstream firms only induce a peak early in the sensing 
window. Thus, the marginal impact of emissions from upstream firms on the maximum 
concentration is generally greater than that of emissions from downstream firms. 
The experiment instructions described the process that as the byproduct flows 
downstream, it spreads out and dilutes so that the concentration decreases with distance 
(see Supporting Information Text S2) Emissions from upstream firms can have less 
marginal impact on maximum concentration depending on the parameter values in 
QUAL2K. In our parameterized model, the background loading was set at a high level 
relative to the parameters associated with the dilution process. As a result, the diluted 
emissions from upstream firms have a larger marginal impact on maximum concentration 
at the sensor, and conversely, emissions from downstream firms (which have not diluted 
when the pollutants pass the sensor) have a smaller marginal impact. This difference was 
not explained to subjects. Given the complexities of the stream flow dynamics, this design 
focused on providing participants with opportunities to learn of these dynamics through 
experience instead of relying solely on a written description to explain this 
difference.  Participants were given time to learn the dynamics of their position on the 
stream and relative impact on emissions at the sensor through practice rounds and the 
calculator which provided insight into the stream flow dynamics. 
The ability of an ambient-based policy to affect the behavior that influences the 
maximum concentration just downstream of parcel 6 depends on the ability of the 
monitoring technology to observe concentrations near the maximum. With continuous 
monitoring, the timing of the maximum concentration is observed with certainty. For the 
discrete monitoring case, the observed maximum will depend on the randomly selected 
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time when the monitoring occurs. With continuous monitoring, the duration effect 
dominates the magnitude effect such that parcels further away from the sensor have a larger 
impact on the observed maximum concentration than parcels downstream. Importantly, 
under discrete monitoring the magnitude effect becomes relatively more important such 
that the impact of emissions of downstream firms on the observed maximum concentration 
is inversely related to the monitoring frequency. The intuition here is that the average 
marginal impact of emissions from downstream firms on the observed maximum 
concentration increases because the peak caused by emissions of downstream firms early 
in the sensing window is taken into the expectation of the measured concentration.  
 
2.2 Experiment Protocol  
Six sessions of the experiment were run using 108 undergraduate students at a large public 
university on the East Coast of the United States. All decisions were made on networked 
computers. The experiment was implemented with a computer interface, Willow [McCabe 
and Weel, 2010], and a Python framework, which integrates the QUAL2K model described 
above.  
Each session consists of 18 participants, organized randomly into independent 
stream groups of six participants. Each participant is assigned to one of the six parcels for 
each treatment. Stream groups and parcel locations within each stream group are randomly 
shuffled between treatments. To control for potential order effects across treatments, we 
systematically vary the treatment orders in each session. Each treatment consists of six 
decision rounds. In each round, participants make one confidential production decision and 
learn the measured level of ambient pollution, the tax/subsidy that they face, and their total 
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profit from the round. Rounds are independent in that production decisions and 
concentration outcomes do not affect outcomes in future rounds.  
Prior to making any decisions, experiment participants have approximately fifteen 
minutes to read the instructions (see Supporting Information Text S2) for the first treatment. 
They then hear an oral presentation that emphasizes how production decisions affect their 
profit, the underlying water quality model, and the ambient tax/subsidy structure. The exact 
details of the water quality model are not explained. Instead participants receive a 
qualitative explanation of the model and several numerical examples.  
To help participants understand the experiment and formulate their production 
decisions, they are given time to use the calculator which allows them to enter hypothetical 
production decisions for each parcel and then see the measured concentration, tax/subsidy, 
and profits. In treatments with discrete rather than continuous monitoring frequency, the 
measured concentration is stochastic for a given production set. In these cases, the 
calculator reports the expected concentration, tax/subsidy and profits based on the 
distribution of possible sensing values. These calculations change with each treatment. The 
written instructions include a guided training on the use of the calculator and require that 
participants use the calculator to identify the outcomes for several different levels of 
production.  The participant answers are checked by the experiment administrators to 
ensure that participants know how to correctly operate and interpret the calculator.  
The first three rounds for all sessions are practice rounds with hypothetical payoffs, 
which follow the “no policy” treatment. Additional instructions and an oral presentation 
are provided to the participants before each new treatment to explain the relevant sensing 
regime. Each session takes roughly one hour and 45 minutes for participants to complete. 
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The financial payoff earned by participants is determined based on the outcomes of each 
round and it is paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The average payoff was $29 with 
a standard deviation of $2. 
In each round, participants make anonymous individual production decisions, 
which directly determine their emissions level and private payoff. The profit a participant 
receives is the sum of the private payoff and the tax/subsidy determined by the regulator. 
The private payoff function is based on Spraggon [2002] and is quadratic in production, xn, 
and takes the form  
In (xn) = 35 – 0.0075*(50 – xn)2, for n = 1, 2,..., 6,                                       (1) 
where In represents the private payoff and xn is the production level of participant n. 
Participants choose a production level between 0 and 50. The individual emissions 
contributed from a parcel are equivalent to that parcel’s production level.  We assume that 
one unit of production leads to 1000 µgN/L emission of nitrogen dioxide at one time step. 
As such, we refer to production and emissions interchangeably. If a participant chooses a 
production level of zero, their emissions equal zero. The distribution of the pollutant 
concentration over time at one location in the river is determined by the joint decisions of 
all upstream participants, conforming to the nutrient transport model described above.  
In each of the treatments it is assumed that damage from pollution occurs just 
downstream of the six parcels and the damage is determined by the maximum 
concentration of the pollutant. The damage function takes the form 
 D(x1, x2, … , x6) = 10*Cmax(x1, x2, … , x6),                                                   (2) 
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where D(x1, x2, … , x6) is the damage and Cmax(x1,x2, … ,x6) is the maximum concentration 
just downstream of all parcels in a given round. We assume the regulator seeks to maximize 
the net social benefit, given by 
 NSB = ∑  In (𝑥𝑛)
6
𝑛=1 − D (𝑥1, 𝑥2 … , 𝑥6).                        (3) 
We calculate the socially optimal emission array of x1, x2, … , x6 using numerical 
techniques (Table 2, also see Supporting Information Text S3). Under the calibrated stream 
and pollution dynamics, the optimal total emissions across all firms are 200, with 
heterogeneity across firms based on spatial location. Specifically, the marginal effect of 
increases in emissions on maximum concentration is higher for upstream parcels than for 
downstream parcels. The furthest downstream parcel (parcel 6) optimally has the highest 
emissions while the parcel furthest upstream (parcel 1) has the lowest emissions. 
Based on Segerson [1988], an ambient tax/subsidy instrument is used to incentivize 
firms to reduce emissions and improve efficiency. The tax/subsidy that each firm must pay 
in each round is a linear function of measured concentration and is contingent on each 
participant’s decision. The tax/subsidy is defined as follows: 
T(x1, x2, … , x6) = 10(Threshold  - C (x1, x2, … , x6) ),                            (4)  
where T(x1, x2, … , x6) is the tax/subsidy, C(x1, x2, … , x6) is the measured maximum 
concentration level, and the Threshold is an exogenously determined concentration level 
set by the regulator. When T is negative, all six participants pay a tax; otherwise they all 
receive a subsidy. Note that all participants pay the same tax (or receive the same subsidy) 
depending on the measured maximum concentration and the marginal tax/subsidy rate is 
equal to the marginal damage from pollution. 
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2.3 Treatments 
There are two primary treatment variables: the number of sensors (one or two) and the 
frequency of sensing (low, high, and continuous, Table 1). The treatments have either one 
sensor located just downstream of parcel 6 (Treatments B, C and D) or two sensors placed 
just downstream of parcels 3 and 6 (Treatments E, F and G). Moreover, the treatments have 
the sensor(s) measure the concentration of pollutant at low sensing frequency (Treatments 
B and E), high sensing frequency (Treatments C and F), or continuously (Treatments D 
and G). We also implement a treatment without the ambient tax/subsidy as a “no policy” 
baseline (Treatment A). Next, we describe the seven treatments and the computed Nash 
equilibria in detail.  
Treatment A: Treatment A is a baseline treatment in which there is no policy 
implemented to control pollution level. As such, we expect that every participant will 
choose an emissions level of 50 to maximize their payoff. In the other treatments, the 
tax/subsidy policy is imposed and we expect emissions levels and emissions to be lower 
than in Treatment A. 
Treatments B, C, & D: For these three treatments, one sensor is placed just 
downstream of parcel 6, which measures the concentration resulting from the emissions 
decisions of all six firms. The frequency of measurement is varied across the three 
treatments. In Treatment B, the sensor measures the concentration at one random moment 
during the sensing window. In Treatment C, the sensor measures the concentration at four 
random moments and the maximum observation is chosen to be the measured 
concentration. In Treatment D, the sensor measures the concentration continuously and 
thus observes the maximum concentration with certainty. The ambient tax/subsidy is 
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determined by the difference between the measured concentration and the threshold 
determined by the regulator. The threshold varies by treatment and is designed such that 
the average ambient tax/subsidy is approximately zero when each participant chooses an 
emission level of 25.  
Importantly, as explained previously, the differences in monitoring frequency 
across treatments influence the extent to which emissions at a particular parcel influence 
the magnitude of the tax/subsidy. Emissions by firms that are far away from the sensor 
have a bigger impact on the maximum concentration. Therefore, with the continuous 
sensing in Treatment D upstream firms have a larger impact on the magnitude of the 
tax/subsidy than downstream firms. When monitoring occurs less frequently, the impact of 
emissions from downstream (upstream) firms on the measured maximum concentration 
level increases (decreases).  
Since participants are not allowed to communicate, we focus on exploring potential 
non-cooperative outcomes. Using numerical optimization (see Supporting Information S3), 
the theoretic prediction of each participant’s emission for Treatments B, C and D is 
presented in Table 2. These arrays of emission levels represent Nash equilibria (NE), since 
no one participant gets more benefit if he/she deviates from the predicted emission level. 
In Treatment D, the NE is equivalent to the social optimum, a result that is determined 
based on the parameterization of the tax/subsidy rate.   
Treatments E, F, & G:  In these three treatments, a second sensor is placed just 
downstream of parcel 3, which changes the spatial resolution of ambient pollution 
monitoring. The measurement frequency of each sensor in Treatments E, F, and G are 
determined identically to the measurements in Treatments B, C and D, respectively. The 
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tax/subsidy for participants located in the lower (upper) three parcels is determined by the 
difference between the measured concentration from the sensor just downstream of parcel 
6 (parcel 3) and the threshold is determined by the regulator. To maintain consistency with 
the treatments that involve one sensor, the threshold for the participants in the upper three 
parcels is reduced such that the average ambient tax/subsidy is 0 when each participant 
produces 25. Thresholds for participants at the lower three parcels in these three treatments 
are the same as the threshold in Treatments B, C and D, respectively.  
Measured concentration by the sensor just downstream of parcel 3 is only 
dependent on emissions from the upper three parcels, and the observed concentration at the 
sensor just downstream of parcel 6 is determined by all six parcels. Like in treatments B 
and C, the actual tax/subsidy faced by participants in treatments E and F is determined by 
the timing of the monitoring. Predicted emissions from each parcel are presented in Table 
2.  The NE for Treatment G is equivalent to the social optimum and the NE in Treatments 
E and F are approximately the same as the equilibrium predictions in Treatments B and C 
respectively.  
Interestingly, the predicted emissions show that adding sensor just downstream of 
parcel 3 does not affect the equilibrium of the three upstream parcels even though intuition 
suggests otherwise. This result stems from two opposing effects of the additional sensor.  
The distance between the upper sensor and the upstream parcels become shorter, and hence 
the ‘duration effect’ is expected to be smaller. This would reduce the expected damage. 
Simultaneously, the ‘magnitude effect’ increases the marginal damage of the upstream 
parcels. In our parameterized model, this effect offsets the duration effect and increases the 
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expected damage of the upstream parcels. Combined, increasing the number of sensors is 
therefore not expected to influence behavior if participants follow the NE.  
 
2.4 Testable hypotheses 
The experimental design allows us to form four basic hypotheses related to the impact of 
the tax/subsidy policy and changes in the sensing regime on individual behavior and social 
efficiency.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Emissions are lower in treatments that include the tax/subsidy policy 
than in the baseline (“no policy”) Treatment A. 
 
This first basic hypothesis stems directly from the expectation that the tax/subsidy policy 
acts as a disincentive for emissions given that every unit increase in the maximum pollution 
concentration level observed at the sensor reduces each firm’s payoff by 10 experimental 
dollars. If the tax/subsidy policy does not influence behavior then altering the monitoring 
regime will not influence outcomes.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Enhanced temporal resolution of pollution concentration 
measurements influence the allocation of emissions, with parcels further away from the 
sensor reducing emissions relatively more than parcels close to the sensor.  
 
Hypothesis 2 emphasizes that differences in temporal resolution are expected to induce 
different emission levels at specific parcels across treatments. Going from discrete to 
continuous sensing changes the extent to which each parcel influences the observed 
maximum concentration level. In the low frequency sensing treatment, all firms are 
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predicted to abate about the same amount because each firm has the same impact on 
measured concentration. However, in the enhanced temporal measurements treatments, 
upstream firms are predicted to emit less than downstream firms since upstream firms have 
more impact on measured maximum concentration than downstream firms (Table 2). As 
such, we hypothesize that increases in the frequency of sensing will alter the allocation of 
emissions, with more emissions occurring downstream. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Enhanced spatial resolution of pollution concentration 
measurements will not influence individual behavior.  
 
The treatments are parameterized such that increasing the number of sensors from one to 
two does not have a large impact on the NE emissions prediction at each parcel (treatments 
B vs. E, C vs. F, and D vs. G; Table 2).  
 
Hypothesis 4: Social welfare is highest under the ambient tax/subsidy policy with 
continuous sensing. 
 
In Treatment A, behavior is predicted to generate net social benefits that are lower than the 
optimal net social benefits both because of excessive emissions levels and because of an 
inefficient allocation of emissions across firms. Social efficiency is predicted to be higher 
in all treatments that involve the ambient tax/subsidy given that the policy provides 
incentives to reduce emissions (Hypothesis 1). Social efficiency is also expected to increase 
with more frequent sensing given that it improves the allocation of emissions decisions by 
providing incentives for upstream firms to reduce emissions more than downstream firms 
(Hypothesis 2). In addition, increasing the spatial resolution of sensing is not predicted to 
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impact behavior (Hypothesis 3). These three outcomes taken together suggest that the 
highest levels of social efficiency are expected in Treatments D and G, which involve the 
ambient tax/subsidy policy based on continuous sensing. 
 
3. Results 
In this section, we highlight four key results from the experiment, organized by the four 
hypotheses.  
 
RESULT 1: Emissions levels in treatments with the ambient tax/subsidy policy are 
lower than emissions in the “no policy” Treatment A. (Supports H1)  
 
The first result is based off of a simple inspection of the mean observed emissions levels 
provided in Table 2. In Treatment A, observed emissions at each parcel are never 
significantly different from the predicted emissions level of 50. When the ambient 
tax/subsidy policy is introduced in Treatments B – G, aggregate emissions are lower than 
the aggregate emissions in Treatment A (p < 0.01). In addition, mean emissions for each 
parcel are lower in Treatments B – G than in Treatment A. These results provide support 
for Hypothesis 1. 
It is noteworthy that in every treatment, the ambient tax/subsidy policy results in 
lower aggregate emissions than that predicted by the NE. In other words, the tax/subsidy 
policy leads to excessive reductions in emissions in each case. This result is consistent with 
results from experimental economics studies of the tax/subsidy policy reported in Vossler 
et al. [2006] and Poe et al. [2004] with participants that are able to communicate given the 
possibility of group subsidies in low emission situations. Although the participants in our 
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experiment were not able to communicate, the collusive equilibrium provides incentives 
for groups to reduce emissions levels below the NE. It appears that the experimental setting 
that participants confronted in our sessions leads to tacit collusion that is similar to the 
collusion possible under communication. This is particularly dramatic in Treatment B, 
where aggregate emissions are significantly lower than they are in any other treatment 
setting. Not surprisingly, Treatment B has a collusive equilibrium in which, if all firms 
emit zero, they can earn higher profits from collusion than in any other treatment. 
 
RESULT 2: Under the ambient tax/subsidy policy, increasing the frequency of 
sensing leads to higher emissions for downstream parcels relative to upstream parcels 
(supports H2).  
 
The effect of increased sensing frequency can be observed in Table 2. In Treatments B and 
E, which involve sensing at one random moment during the sensing window, emissions 
are relatively constant across the parcels, consistent with the theoretic prediction. In 
Treatments D and G, with continuous sensing, emissions are higher, on average, for the 
three downstream parcels than for the three upstream parcels, although the increase in 
emissions levels are not monotonic as one moves from upstream to downstream parcels. 
Additionally, going from low to high frequency sensing appears to have a larger effect on 
behavior than going from high to continuous frequency sensing.  
To evaluate the effect of sensing frequency on emissions, we use pairwise 
comparisons between treatments at each parcel location (Table 3). The numbers reported 
in the table reflect the difference in going from a lower to a higher frequency of sensing at 
a given parcel. If increasing the frequency influences behavior as suggested by the NE, 
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then we should observe negative numbers for upstream parcels (reflecting a decrease in 
emissions) and positive numbers for downstream parcels (reflecting an increase in 
emissions).  
The results show that varying the frequency of sensing changes individual behavior 
at some parcels. For the single sensor treatments, both high and continuous frequency 
sensing (Treatments C and D) lead to higher emissions in downstream parcels relative to 
low frequency sensing (Treatment B). At parcels 4 and 5, high frequency leads to higher 
emissions relative to continuous sensing, a result not predicted by theory. The frequency 
of sensing with one sensor does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on the 
behavior of upstream parcels.  
When there are two sensors, we observe some differences. Compared to low 
frequency in Treatment E, the high and continuous frequency sensing in Treatments F and 
G generally leads to significantly lower emissions in upstream parcels. Higher frequency 
sensing leads to higher emissions in some cases at downstream parcels 5 and 6, but this 
result is not as robust as it is with only one sensor.  
Taken together, these results show a general tendency of a reallocation of emissions 
from upstream parcels to downstream parcels with increases in the frequency of sensing. 
The impacts of enhanced temporal resolution on each parcel’s emission, however, are not 
as strong as predicted and the effect of increased sensing is more dramatic when moving 
from low frequency sensing to high frequency sensing than it is going from high frequency 
to continuous sensing. 
 
RESULT 3: Under the ambient tax/subsidy policy, enhanced spatial resolution of 
ambient concentration measurement does not have a systematic impact on emissions. 
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There are no significant differences in aggregate emissions across Treatments C – G, which 
suggests that increasing the number of sensors does not have a dramatic impact on average 
behavior. The one anomaly is Treatment B, which has aggregate emissions that are 
significantly lower than in all other treatment settings (p < 0.05). Evaluating differences in 
individual emissions across parcels, pairwise comparison of individual emissions paired 
by frequency (similar to regression analysis in Table 3) reveals a few noteworthy outcomes. 
Emissions by upstream firms in treatments with enhanced frequency of sensing are 
generally lower with two sensors than they are with one sensor (only one difference is 
statistically significant). This outcome is not predicted by non-cooperative theory, but does 
align to some extent with the collusive equilibria, which predict lower emissions amongst 
the three upstream firms relative to the three downstream firms. Increasing spatial 
resolution of sensors has mixed impacts on downstream parcels with five differences of 
pairwise comparisons being positive and four negative. However, only two of them are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
RESULT 4: Social efficiency is highest in treatments that involve the ambient 
tax/subsidy policy with high frequency and continuous sensing (partial support for H4).  
 
Relative to the no policy setting, efficiency can be enhanced by both reducing total 
emissions and reallocating emissions from upstream firms to downstream firms. We follow 
Spraggon [2002] and define efficiency as the change in the value of net social benefits as 
a percentage of the optimal change in social benefits from the status quo: 
        SE = (NSBactual - NSBstatus quo) / ( NSBoptimal - NSBstatus quo),                                  (5) 
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where SE represents the social efficiency, NSBactual is the actual net social benefit, NSBstatus 
quo is the net social benefit when their emissions are equivalent to the competitive level of 
emissions, and NSBoptimal is the net social benefit with socially optimal behavior. This 
measure of efficiency ignores the regulator’s cost of acquiring, implementing, and 
operating sensors. 
Additionally, we follow Suter et al. [2008] to decompose SE as a product of 
Emission Efficiency (EE) and Allocative Efficiency (AE), which provides insight into the 
sources of inefficiency. EE measures the efficiency loss arising from the differences 
between actual aggregate emissions and optimal aggregate emissions. A low EE indicates 
that aggregate emissions are far from the optimal level. AE measures the efficiency loss 
arising from imperfect allocation of individual emissions on each parcel given a specific 
level of aggregate emissions. AE is equal to 100% if individual emissions are perfectly 
allocated across parcels.   
Both the predicted and actual efficiency outcomes are provided in Table 4. As 
expected, with no policy in place in Treatment A, the observed efficiency level is near zero. 
Efficiency levels are higher in all treatments with the tax/subsidy policy and are 
significantly higher in treatments that involve high frequency or continuous sensing 
compared to low frequency sensing. The emissions and allocative efficiencies that are 
reported in Table 4 provide some interesting insights into the sources of these differences. 
Consistent with the aggregate emissions results discussed earlier, the emissions efficiency 
is lowest in Treatment B given that participants in the treatment engage in excessive 
emissions reductions. Across the remaining five treatments that involve the ambient 
tax/subsidy policy there is no appreciable differences in the emissions efficiency that is 
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observed. The increase in overall efficiency therefore comes primary from higher 
allocative efficiency in treatments that involve higher frequency sensing. This is consistent 
with Result 2, which showed that emissions tend to be allocated more heavily towards 
downstream firms as the frequency of sensing is increased. 
Interestingly, the observed efficiency associated with treatments that involve 
enhanced temporal resolution tends to increase over time (Figure 1). This result comes 
about primarily due to improvements in allocative efficiency over time as participants 
experience the impacts of the tax/subsidy policy and adjust emissions decisions to reflect 
the incentives that vary based on their location.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we incorporate a spatial nutrient transport model into a nonpoint source water 
pollution economic experiment to test the impact of information on emission decisions and 
on efficiency of ambient tax/subsidy policy. Economic experiments are well suited for 
studies where the real behavior is generally unobservable.  We specifically investigate how 
technological limitations to pollution monitoring can affect social efficiency. Imperfect 
information can be caused by technology constraints and constrained monitoring budgets. 
The results from our experiment show that the ambient tax/subsidy policy influences 
producer behavior, reduces pollution, and increases social efficiency. Though all policy 
treatments exhibit lower ambient pollution concentrations, enhanced information, 
especially enhanced temporal information, helps the regulator implement the policy in a 
way that induces polluters to allocate emissions reductions more efficiently. In addition, 
the results suggest that increased frequency of sensor measurements can help move 
behavior closer to the social optimum. 
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The results offer the regulator some insight into the tradeoffs related to investing in 
monitoring technology and effort. They suggest that it may not always be true that more 
information is better in an ambient/tax subsidy instrument. In the experiment, the treatment 
that involved the lowest frequency of sensing and the fewest sensors also induced the 
highest emissions reductions. Note, however, that the emissions reductions were 
substantially larger than optimal and thus this treatment involved the lowest observed 
social efficiency. Increasing the resolution of ambient pollution measurement increases 
efficiency, but it would also likely involve increased cost of monitoring that we do not 
explicitly account for in this experiment design. We also find rapidly diminishing marginal 
returns to increasing the frequency of sensing given that the social efficiency improvements 
associated with going from high frequency sensing to continuous sensing are negligible. In 
addition, when implementing high frequency sensing, the effect of a second sensor is 
limited. While additional sensors may be valuable for purposes of education, scientific 
knowledge, and perhaps identifying the true source of the pollution, the results of this 
research suggest the need to consider the tradeoff between social outcomes and the cost of 
improved monitoring technology.  
 To enhance our ability to reach general conclusions related to the relationship 
between monitoring and the efficiency of ambient-based instruments targeting water 
quality improvements, several of our assumptions could be modified in future research. 
For example, in our model we assume constant background loadings into the surface water 
system. The inclusion of stochastic inflows due to storm events would be an interesting 
extension, since diffusion and concentration of pollutants may change under these 
scenarios. Similarly, an important future extension would be to test the robustness of our 
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results to other types of pollutants such as phosphorous and suspended solids which may 
display different fate and transport characteristics that alter the incentives generated by an 
ambient-based policy. Behaviorally, the introduction of communication among 
participants is also likely to influence behavior and observed social efficiency as groups 
could more easily coordinate on collusive outcomes. 
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Table 1: Treatment conditions 
 
Treatment Label 
Number of  
Sensors 




A Baseline - - No 
 
B One Sensor, 
Low Frequency 
 
1 Low Yes 
C One Sensor, 
High Frequency 
 
1 High Yes 
D One Sensor, 
Continuous 
 
1 Continuous Yes 
E Two Sensors, 
Low Frequency 
 
2 Low Yes 
F Two Sensors, 
High Frequency 
 
2 High Yes 
G Two Sensors, 
Continuous 
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Table 2: Comparison of predicted emission levels (Nash equilibrium) and observed average emission levels by treatment. 
                   Upstream  Downstream Aggregate 
Treatment  Label Emissions Parcel 1 Parcel 2 Parcel 3 Parcel 4 Parcel 5 Parcel 6 Emissions  
A Baseline Predicted  50 50 50 50 50 50 300 
  Observed  47.68 48.64 49.01 49.08 46.37 49.82 290.58 
 
B One Sensor, Predicted  33.5 33.4 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 200.1 
 Low Frequency Observed  22.18 22.08 25.64 23.34 26.49 24.87 144.60 
 
C One Sensor, Predicted  21.8 22.8 28.5 36.5 44.6 48.8 203 
 High Frequency 
 
Observed  25.43 22.81 26.54 33.83 37.35 30.67 176.58 
 
D One Sensor, Predicted  20 24 30 33 44 49 200 
 Continuous 
 
Observed  26.72 25.63 27.93 27.63 32.48 33.51 173.88 
 
E Two Sensors, Predicted  33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 199.8 
 Low Frequency Observed  32.48 29.25 21.55 27.38 27.95 28.79 167.4 
 
F Two Sensors, Predicted  22 20.2 29 38.4 45 48.9 203.5 
 High Frequency Observed  21.20 26.78 25.34 29.90 29.43 36.88 169.56 
 
G Two Sensors, Predicted  20 24 30 33 44 49 200 
 Continuous Observed  25.89 21.77 20.31 25.35 41.08 28.73 163.14 
 
Optimal emission based on linear damage 20 24 30 33 44 49 200 
Mean of observed average emission 
(excluding Treatment A) 
25.65 24.72 24.55 27.9 32.46 30.58  
Notes: Predicted emissions and optimal emission based on linear damage are computed by algorithm described in Text S3 in Supporting Information. Observed emission is 
averaged across all rounds by treatment and parcel. Aggregate emission (last column) is the sum of observed average emission across six parcels by treatment.  Mean of observed 
average emission (last row) is averaged across Treatments B through G for each parcel.  
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Table 3: Effects of increased sensing frequency based on pairwise comparison of individual emissions by parcel, treatments paired by 
number of sensors. 
 Dependent variable: Individual emissions  
Parcels 
Treatments B vs. 
C 
(one sensor) 
Treatments B vs. 
D 
(one sensor) 
Treatments C vs. 
D 
(one sensor) 
Treatments E vs. 
F 
(two sensors) 
Treatments E vs. 
G 
(two sensors) 
Treatments F vs. 
G 
(two sensors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













































































Notes: These 36 pairwise comparisons are OLS regressions in which dependent variable is individual emission and the independent variable is frequency dummy which is equal to 
one if frequency is higher. Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N = 216 in each cell. 
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Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses (for example, s.d. = 0.09 means standard of efficiency is 9%)
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Notes: Each point on the figure is the efficiency averaged across six experiment sessions for each treatment. N = 18 for 
each point. 

















1 2 3 4 5 6
Round
Treatment B Treatment C
Treatment D Treatment E
Treatment F Treatment G
